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V 
JURlSDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(UCCPA), I.C. §§19-4901 et seq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant John David Wurdemann appeals from the denial of post-
conviction relief by the district court, Third Judicial District. Wurdemann's conviction 
was vacated upon a Rule 60(b) motion. (See Attachment A (Canyon County case no. CV-
2003-4362, Judgment filed July 21, 2015)). The State is appealing that order in the 
companion case captioned above. Thus, Wurdemann appeals the denial of those post-
conviction issues that were not the subject of the Rule 60(b) motion, i.e., the remaining 
issues. 
II. Procedural History 
Petitioner-Appellant John David Wurdemann was indicted on seven felony counts 
related to the attack of Linda LeBrane by four strangers on Interstate 84 in Canyon County, 
Idaho. He was initially represented by the Canyon county public defender, Klaus Weibe 
and Scott F ouser. He subsequently hired Van Bishop, who entered into the case just a few 
weeks prior to trial. 
Wurdemann was tried and convicted by jury for (1) conspiracy to commit robbery, 
(2) robbery, (3) conspiracy to commit first degree kidnapping, ( 4) first degree kidnapping, 
(5) aggravated battery, (6) aiding and abetting first degree arson, and (7) aiding and abetting 
attempted first degree murder. The district court sentenced Wurdemann to fixed life on 
each of the first four counts just listed; a fixed 15 year sentence on the 5th count; a fixed 
sentence on the 6th count; and a fixed 15 year sentence on 7th count. The 
court ordered the seven sentences run concurrently; however, court further 
ordered they run consecutive to previously-existing sentences stemming from two 
unrelated cases. 
Wurdemann requested his trial attorney file a direct appeal, but Van Bishop did not 
do so. (See Transcript Post Conviction Evidentiary Hearing held August 2 & 4, 2011 
(hereinafter "Tr, EH"), p.29 L.20 - p.30 L.8). After filing a post-conviction action based 
on counsel's failure to timely file an appeal, his direct appeal was reinstated. (See Clerk's 
Record of Trial (hereinafter "R. Trial"), Vol. II, pp.298-301, p.315, p.310, pp.324-327). 
On February 6, 2004, Wurdemann filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (See 
generally R. Trial, Vol. II, pp.329-332). The State Appellate Public Defender office 
("SAPD") was appointed to represent Wurdemann on direct appeal. Two issues were 
raised, specifically (1) whether the district court erred in allowing a police officer, 
Detective Baker, to testify that a third party, Lynn Bumgardner, told him Wurdemann had 
a propensity for violence; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing the maximum sentence for each of the seven convictions. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of convictions and the sentences. State v. Wurdemann, 
Docket No. 30438, Opinion No. 370 (Ct. App. 2006)(unpublished). 
Wurdemann then timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief with the 
district court. (Clerk's Record of Post Conviction (hereinafter "R. PC), pp.6-12). The 
court appointed Van Bishop to review and investigate the petition for post-conviction relief 
and allowed the defendant twenty days to file an amended petition and gave notice of its 
intent to dismiss the petition. (R. PC, p.32). Van Bishop failed to respond whatsoever. (R. 
2 
p.32). The court proceeded to appoint the Canyon County Public Defender's Office. 
Scott Fouser from that office began representing Wurdemann. (See 
generally, R. PC, pp.35-76). The court allowed Wurdemann to file an amended petition 
for post-conviction relief. (R. PC, pp.59-64). Scott Fouser was later appointed as private 
counsel with fees paid by the County. (R. PC, pp.77-82), but subsequently withdrew based 
on a conflict of interest. (R. PC, pp.91-92, pp. I 00-101 ). Tue court then re-appointed the 
Canyon County Public Defender's Office with attorney Mark Mimura representing 
Wurdemann. (See generally, R. PC, pp.108-111). Ultimately, attorney Brian Neville took 
over the representation, and represented Wurdemann for the remainder of the post-
conviction proceedings including the evidentiary hearing. (See generally, R. PC, pp.111-
164). Following an evidentiary hearing on the amended petition (during which time 
counsel withdrew three of the nine issues raised in the amended petition), the district court 
denied relief on all remaining claims. 
SAPD was appointed to appeal the denial of the post-conviction but turned the case 
over to attorney Leo Griffard due to a conflict of interest. On July 20, 2012, Griffard filed 
a Rule 60(b) motion, in which Wurdemann asserted he unknowingly withdrew three critical 
claims including that his conviction was wrongfully obtained based upon suggestive 
lineups and misidentification. The district court granted the Rule 60(b) motion and 
scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Griffard withdrew from the case, and attorney Elisa G. 
Massoth was appointed. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court granted relief 
on those claims in the post-conviction petition having to do with identification and vacated 
Wurdemann's convictions and sentences. (See Attachment B (Canyon County case no. 
3 
CV-2003-4362, Order on for Post Conviction Relief filed June 8, 2015)). 
is appealing that decision companion case docket no. 43384-2015. 
III. Statement Of Facts 
In the early morning hours of June 15, 2000, four people in another vehicle forced 
Linda LeBrane to stop her car along Interstate 84 in Canyon County, Idaho. The four- 3 
men and I woman were unknown to LeBrane. The strangers demanded money and drugs 
and forcibly drove her to a dark field along a country road. LeBrane was robbed, stabbed, 
and hit on the head with a baseball bat. Her car was set on fire. LeBrane was then left in 
a field, where she was ultimately found and taken for treatment. See State v. Wurdemann, 
Docket No. 30438 (Ct. App. 2006, unpublished opinion no. 370). 
The police had no solid leads for approximately two years. (Transcript of Trial 
(hereinafter "Tr. Trial"), p.630, Ls.3-9). Initially, LeBrane, with the assistance of others, 
helped compile sketches of the attackers. Periodically, the police would show LeBrane a 
photographic lineup, and LeBrane would invariably identify someone as her attacker. (Tr. 
Trial, p.623, L.18 - p.627, L.12; p.633, L.18 - p.647, L.16). The identifications were 
incorrect; and no arrests were made. See State v. John Wurdemann, Docket No. 30438, 
Opinion No. 370 (Ct. App. 2006)(unpublished), p.2 (describing prolonged investigation 
that included several misidentifications by LeBrane ). 
In March 2002, LeBrane identified more people as her attackers, including John 
Wurdemann, his brother Kenneth Wurdemann, Jeremy Sanchez, and Sarah Pearce. (See 
Tr. Trial, p.645, L.8 -p.649, 1.20). LeBrane respectively referred to the four as the "greasy 
man," the "fat boy," the "little boy," and "the woman." The four suspects were indicted 
on March 20, 2002, each on all seven charges described earlier. (R. Trial, Vol. I, pp.20-
4 
27). The identification of Wurdemann was based on a video line-up that was highly 
suggestive and improper. (See Attachment B, pp.6-7). The identification was also flawed 
because LeBrai.'le was high on marijuana at the time of the attack, she suffered traumatic 
head injury during the attack, she was unconscious for part of the attack, she was attacked 
in the dark, two years had elapsed between the attack and her identification ofWurdemann 
during which time she was undergoing psychiatric care, and she was confusing "facts" 
presented in a television reenactment and through sketch artistry with the actual events and 
memories of the attack (Tr. Trial p.596 L.15 - p.597 L.1 (hit by baseball bat on base of 
skull and lost consciousness); p.586 Ls.11-12 (had smoked marijuana prior to attack); 
p.630 Ls.3-9 (waiting 25 months for case to be solved while undergoing psychiatric care); 
p.661 L.24-p.663 L.18 (left Baker City around midnight and didn't stop until beginning 
of attack); pp.626-627 (discussing America's Most Wanted taping). 
Three weeks prior to trial, Wurdemann retained private counsel Van Bishop. Van 
Bishop did not ask for an extension of time to prepare for trial. Despite the complexity and 
seriousness of the case, Van Bishop only met with his client for about 30 minutes at the 
prison and about another 30 minutes the night before trial. (Tr. EH, p.28 Ls.12-24). 
Neither initial trial counsel nor Van Bishop challenged the admissibility of eyewitness 
testimony, including that of LeBrane, even though there was ample evidence of law 
enforcement's use of misleading and suggestive lineup techniques, and evidence that 
LeBrane and other eyewitnesses' identifications were highly suspect. (See generally, 
Attachment B). 
A three day jury trial commenced on August 13, 2002. During jury selection, Van 
Bishop did not challenge for cause or use a preemptory strike on juror no. 328, even though 
5 
the juror worked with law enforcement and knew many investigating officers. 
180 18; p. 121 Ls.5-8). Van Bishop also not challenge, strike, or 
even question juror no. 444, even though that juror acknowledged being friend with a 
Nampa police officer and acquaintances with several other police officers. (Tr. Trial, p.159 
Ls.15-24). From his opening statement and throughout the trial, Van Bishop referred to 
Wurdemann as "the greasy man," to the jurors. The State did the same. 
The defense called Lynn Bumgardner to testify. Bumgardner had a relationship 
with Kenneth Wurdemann, and they lived in South Carolina. Bumgardner testified that 
she and Kenneth came to visit Idaho in June 2000, but Kenneth did not have any contact 
with John Wurdemann until at least June 19, 2000, four days after the attack on LeBrane. 
(Tr. Trial, p.864, L.12 p.866, L.15; p.867, Ls.5-17; p.868, Ls.4-8). On cross-examination, 
the State questioned Bumgardner about statements she allegedly made to South Carolina 
Detective Baker wherein she described Wurdemann as having a propensity for violence 
and the attack was something Wurdemann was capable of. Bumgardner denied having 
made those statements. (Tr. Trial, p.875 L.23 -p.876 L.4). 
The State called Detective Baker as a rebuttal witness. Baker testified that 
Bumgardner told him that Wurdemann "was capable of any violence," that she had known 
him to commit violent acts, that the attack of LeBrane "sounded like something he would 
do," and "she would not put anything past John David [Wurdemann]." (Tr. Trial, p.888 
Ls.8-17). Van Bishop objected on hearsay grounds, but was overruled. (Tr. Trial, p.887 
L.20 - p.888 L.5). 
The jury found Wurdemann guilty on all seven counts. The district court sentenced 
him to four life sentences, two fixed 15-year sentences, and a fixed 25-year sentence. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann's Claim That 
Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance, Violation Of The Sixth 
Amendment, In Continually Referring To Wurdemann As "The Greasy 
Man" 
VIII. Whether The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann's Claim That 
Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth 
Amendment, In Failing To Challenge Juror No. 328 For Cause Or Exercise 
A Preemptory Strike Even Though The Juror Was Employed By The 
Nampa Police Department 
IX. Whether The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann's Claim That 
Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth 
Amendment, In Failing To Question Or Challenge Juror No. 444 About The 
Juror's Friendship With A Nampa Police Officer As Well As The Juror's 
Acquaintances With Other Police Officers 
X. Whether The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann's Claim That 
Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth 
Amendment, In Failing To Request A Limiting Instruction Upon Admission 
Of Detective Baker's Testimony About Lynn Bumgardner's Allegedly 
Inconsistent Statements About Petitioner's Violent Character, And In 
Failing To Request A Jury Instruction Explaining That Detective Baker's 
Testimony About What Lynn Bumgardner Had Said Could Be Considered 
For Impeachment Purposes Only 
XL Whether The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann's Claim That 
Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth 
Amendment, In Failing To Move For Judgment Of Acquittal On Count Six 
Of The Indictment, As There Was Insufficient Proof Of The Crime Of 
[Aiding And Abetting] First Degree Arson; Or In Denying The Alternative 
Claim That Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Raise That 
Issue 
XII. Whether All Or Some Claims Constitute Cumulative Error 
7 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
L Standard Of Review Appeal 
The standard of review of the denial of post-conviction is well established. 
application for post-conviction relief is a special proceeding, civil in nature. State v. 
Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676 (1983). In order to prevail in such an action, the applicant must 
prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865 
(1990). When reviewing a decision denying a petition for post-conviction relief after an 
evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65 
(Ct.App.1990). When faced with mixed questions of fact and law, the appellate court 
defers to the factual findings made by lower courts if those determinations are based upon 
substantial evidence, but exercises free review of the application of the relevant law to 
those facts. Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52 (Ct.App.1988); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 
921-22 (Ct.App.1992). Constitutional issues are questions of law subject to free review, 
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89 (2004), as are the propriety of jury instructions. State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 136 (2001); Clarkv. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156 (2002). 
IL Standard For Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel 
under both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
whether based upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar 
Strickland v. Washington standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail 
under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient in 
8 
that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance, and 2) that this 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
The prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim is established if there is a 
reasonable probability that a different result would have been obtained in the case if the 
attorney had acted properly. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."' Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 958-59 (9th 
Cir.1999) (quoting Strickland at 694). 
The prejudice prong of Strickland is clearly objective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (to 
establish prejudice a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different"); see also Campbell v. State, at 547-548 (following a post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing involving ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appeals court exercises free 
review over legal conclusions); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 795 (1985)(demonstrating 
that Idaho Supreme Court addresses the legal merits of a denied ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim denied by post-conviction court, and makes the legal determination of the 
probable outcome of a suppression motion anew). 
A criminal defendant is likewise entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on 
his first appeal of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)(holding a criminal defendant 
is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The failure to raise an issue on appeal may 
be deficient on its face. See United States v. Reinhart, 357 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 
2004)(appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise meritorious sentencing guidelines 
issue which would have resulted in lesser sentence); Brown v. United States, 167 F.3d 109 
9 
1999)(appellate counsel ineffective not raising obviously deficient 
instruction). 
I. The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann' s Claim That Trial Counsel 
Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth Amendment, In 
Continually Referring To Wurdemann As "The Greasy Man" 
A Introduction to Claim 
During the course of the investigation, Linda LeBrane used the terms "Greasy 
Man," "Fat Boy", "Little Boy," and "the woman" to refer to her four attackers. Eventually, 
after selecting numerous suspects in error, she used the term "Greasy Man" to refer to 
Wurdemann, "Fat Boy" to refer to Kenneth Wurdemann, "Little Boy" to refer to Jeremy 
Sanchez,and "thewoman"toreferto Sarah Pearce. (Tr. Trialp.572Ls.12-15;p.581 Ls.8-
9; p.608 Ls.21-24; p.608 Ls.15-18). 
Correctly recognizing the highly prejudicial nature of using "Greasy Man" to 
describe his client, Wurdemann's original public defender filed a motion to strike the 
reference to Wurdemann as the "Greasy Man" from the indictment. (R. Trial, Vol. I, pp. 78-
79 (arguing the names used in the Indictment are "derogatory, highly prejudicial and 
designed to inflame passion and prejudice against the defendant.") As to Wurdemann, the 
motion was granted. (R. Trial, Vol. I, pp.138-140). Retained trial counsel, Van Bishop, 
failed to file a similar motion to preclude the use of the term "Greasy Man" to identify and 
refer to Wurdemann in front of the jury. In all, the term or its likeness was used 
approximately 50 times in front of the jury. (Tr. EH, p.17 Ls.17-19). 
During post-conviction, Wurdemann claimed trial counsel was ineffective for 
allowing this to occur. (R. PC, p.55 ("After previous counsel had filed a motion (which 
was granted) to strike the reference to petitioner as 'Greasy Man' in the Indictment, trial 
10 
counsel continually referred to petitioner by suing the prejudicial name 'Greasy 
The district court denied the claim on the basis that the term was not actually used 
by trial counsel to refer to Wurdemann and that trial counsel made a strategic choice that 
was "virtually unchallengeable." (Tr. EH, p.121 L.20 p.123 L.14). This Court must reject 
that reasoning. 
B. Counsel has a Duty of Loyalty to His Client 
A criminal defense attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client and an "overarching 
duty to advocate the defendant's cause." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Insulting the client 
may breach that duty and constitute ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Cargle v. Mullin, 317 
F.3d 1196, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2003)(granting habeas petition where counsel ridiculed 
petitioner's post-arrest statement, which cast doubt on his client's credibility before the 
jury); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1149, 1462 (11th Cir. 199l)(defense counsel told jury his 
client was not a very good person, was worthless, and expressed hatred toward him). 
Using a pejorative term to refer to a criminal defendant can undermine the 
adversarial process to the extent the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result. Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 733 (Texas Ct. Criminal Appeals 1987)(en 
bane). In Guzmon, defense counsel repeatedly referred to the client as a "wetback," during 
voir dire and during closing arguments. The court found both deficient performance and 
prejudice, stating "it may have been difficult for the jury to realize whose side defense 
counsel were on." Guzman at 733. 
C. The District Court Erred in Dismissing this Claim because Van Bishop 
Breached his Duty of Loyalty to Wurdemann in such an Fgregious Man..rier 
that it Undermined Confidence in the Outcome ofWurdemann's Trial 
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1. Trial counsel's repeated use of"Greasy Man" fell well below the standard 
of reasonable professional performance 
Trial counsel first used the term "Greasy Man" his opening statement. 
p.317 Ls.3-4 (Van Bishop telling jury that LeBrane called the person later identified as 
Wurdemann the "Greasy Guy" or "Greasy Man"). The term was then repeatedly used 
throughout the trial. This failure was egregious and fell well below any standard of 
professionalism. "Greasy" is a highly pejorative term. Previous trial counsel, who moved 
to strike the term from the indictment, correctly recognized the term was "derogatory, 
highly prejudicial and designed to inflame passion and prejudice against the defendant." 
(R. Trial, Vol. I, pp. 78-79). The trial court agreed because the motion was granted. (R. 
Trial, Vol. I, pp.138-140). 
2. The use of the term was so pervasive that it undermined the adversarial 
process 
Once trial counsel used the term "greasy man," it's use became overwhelming. 
See, e.g., Tr. Trial p.526 Ls.14-18 (by defense, witness describing composite as person 
LeBrane referred to as "the greasy guy"); p.572 Ls.12-16 (LeBrane testifying,"And the 
man that I called 'Greasy Man,' who I now know is John Wurdemann ... "); p.572 L.20-21 
(LeBrane testifying she dragged "Greasy Man" for a couple of feet); p.574 Ls.7-9 (LeBrane 
testifying, "I was sitting in the passenger seat and Greasy Man - John Wurdemann - got in 
the driver's seat and they drove me off somewhere."); p.57 4 Ls.23-25 (LeBrane responding 
to question of who drove her vehicle with, "Greasy Man. John Wurdemann."); p.576 L.12 
(LeBrane testifying about actions of "Greasy Man"); p.577 L.11 and L.13 (same); p.581 
L.11 (same); p.581 L.24 (LeBrane testifying, "So then Greasy Man, John Wurdemann, 
... "); p.582 L.17 (LeBrane testifying "Because Greasy man was in the driver's seaL."); 
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p.584 Ls.8-10 (LeBrane describing "Greasy Man" as having stabbed her four or five times 
p.584 -p.585 (LeBrane testifying that the woman attacker "didn't look dirty 
and greasy like Greasy Man."); p.585 Ls.3-13 (LeBrane making two additional references 
to "Greasy Man"); p.592 Ls.9-21 (LeBrane testifying that "Greasy Man" who she 
identified as "John Wurdemann" was the first to cut her); p.593 Ls.6-9 (LeBrane 
testifying "Greasy Man" took her wedding ring off her finger); p.594 Ls.22-23 (LeBrane 
testifying, " ... and John I called 'Greasy Man' because he was so dirty."); p.596 L. l 
(LeBrane referencing "Greasy Man"); p.597 L.24 (same); p.598 Ls.6-7, Ls.15-17 (same); 
p.606 L.25 (same); p.607 Ls.19-25 (LeBrane describing the exhibit she was holding as an 
exhibit as "I have Greasy Man, John Wurdemann."). The term was used about 50 times in 
front of the jurors. Under these circumstances, "it may have been difficult for the jury to 
realize whose side defense counsel were on." See Guzman at 733. 
3. The District Court erred in denying the claim 
The district court's finding that the trial counsel didn't actually refer to Wurdemann 
as the "Greasy Man" is unconvincing. Linda Lebrane identified Wurdemann as the 
attacker to whom she referred in her police interviews. Therefore, every time the phrase 
was used, Wurdemann was that man. 
Moreover, the district court was mistaken in finding trial counsel made a tactical 
decision. The fact that LeBrane used the term to attempt to separate the identities of her 
attackers is not a reasonable explanation for trial counsel's repeated use of the phrase. 
Counsel has a duty to zealously represent his client. Trial counsel had a duty to present his 
client in the most favorable light possible, not acquiesce to the victim's pejorative and 
prejudicial nomenclature. 
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The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann's Claim That Trial Counsel 
Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth Amendment, In Failing 
To Challenge Juror No. 328 For Cause Or Exercise A Preemptory Strike Even 
Though The Juror Was Employed By The Nampa Police Department 
A. Introduction to Claim 
The district court erroneously denied Petitioner's claim that counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to strike juror no. 328, even though the juror 
worked for the Nampa Police Department and was familiar with officers involved in the 
prosecution ofWurdemann. 
B. A Criminal Defendant is Constitutionally Entitled to an Impartial Jury 
It is well settled that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a defendant 
the right to an impartial jury. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988); Irvin v. Dowd, 
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961 ). "The bias or prejudice of even a single juror is enough to violate 
that guarantee." United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)(holding district 
court was obligated to excuse juror for cause, under either implied or express bias theory); 
see also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366 (1966)(stating that a defendant is "entitled 
to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors"). To disqualify a 
juror for cause requires a showing of either actual or implied bias-that is bias in fact or bias 
conclusively presumed as a matter oflaw. Gonzalez, 214 F .3d at 1111. Idaho Code defines 
actual bias as ''the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the 
case, or to either of the parties, which, in the exercise of a sound discretion on the part of 
the trier, leads to the inference that he will not act with entire impartiality." LC. § 19-
2019;1 see also Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112. The presence of a biased juror cannot be 
1 Idaho Code defines implied bias as "such a bias as, when the existence of the fact is 
ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror." LC.§ 19-2019. Idaho Code purports 
to restrict the grounds on which implied bias may be found. LC. § 19-2020 (restricting 
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harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice. Gonzalez, 
214 F.3d at 111 l(internal quotations omitted); citing United States v. Martizez-Salazar, 
U.S. 304, 316 (2000)(noting that "the result in the seating of any juror who should 
have been dismissed for cause ... would require reversal.") 
When trial counsel fails to adequately question or challenge a juror who expresses 
bias, counsel is ineffective. Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2004)(finding trial 
counsel ineffective for failing to adequately question or challenge juror who stated she 
would be "partial" to key state witness.) Counsel's failure to conduct adequate questioning 
or challenge an actually biased juror cannot be justified by strategy because it amounts to 
a waiver of a defendant's basic Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. Id. at 
675-676. "The question of whether to seat a biased juror is not a discretionary or strategic 
decision." Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453,463 (6th Cir. 2001)(finding ineffective 
assistance of counsel where juror made express admission of actual bias with no 
rehabilitation by counsel or the court.) 
Because the presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless, prejudice is presumed 
for purposes of the Strickland analysis. Miller, 385 F.3d at 676. As the Hughes court 
explained, "[t]he question of whether to seat a biased juror is not a discretionary or strategic 
challenges for implied bias to nine specified grounds and no other); see also State v. 
Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63 (Ct. App. 2000)(holding district court erred in removing juror 
for implied bias on grounds not listed in I.C. § 19-2020). However, to the extent those 
grounds are more restrictive than the requirements of the Sixth Amendment or the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the statute is unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1992)(granting habeas relief and holding that 
jurors were impliedly biased as a matter of law where jurors' hotel room was burglarized 
during deliberations in murder-burglary case.)] 
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decision." Failing to challenge a biased is tantamount to waiving a defendant's right 
to an impartial jury: 
If counsel's decision not to challenge a biased venireperson could constitute 
sound trial strategy, then sound trial strategy would include counsel's 
decision to waive, in effect, a criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury. 
However, if counsel cannot waive a criminal defendant's basic Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury "without the fully informed and publicly 
acknowledged consent of the client," Taylor v. fllinois, 484 U.S. 400,417 
n. 24, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), then counsel cannot so waive 
a criminal defendant's basic Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial 
jury. Indeed, given that the presence of a biased juror, like the presence of 
a biased judge, is a "structural defect in the constitution of the trial 
mechanism" that defies harmless error analysis, Johnson, 961 F.2d at 756 
(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 
L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)), to argue sound trial strategy in support of creating 
such a structural defect seems brazen at best. We find that no sound trial 
strategy could support counsel's effective waiver of Petitioner's basic Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by impartial jury. 
Hughes, 258 F.3d at 463. See also Johnson v. Armantrout, 961 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 
I992)(holding counsel's failure to challenge seating of obviously biased jurors "constituted 
ineffectiveness of counsel of a fundamental degree" and stating that because "[t]rying a 
defendant before a biased jury is akin to providing him no trial at all" the failure 
"constitutes a fundamental defect in the trial mechanism itself.") 
C. The District Court Erred in Dismissing this Claim because Trial Counsel 
made No Attempt to Ascertain the Juror's Biases 
Juror 328 was employed by the Nampa Police Department as a community service 
officer. (Tr. Trial p.120, L.18 p.121 L.8). She knew the Nampa police officers "quite 
well." (Tr. Trial p.121, Ls.5-11). Trial counsel failed to ask a single follow-up question 
about the juror's views about police officers or how the juror would assess the credibility 
of colleagues. (See generally, Tr. Trial pp.192-193). 
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Trial counsel's speculation at the evidentiary hearing that the juror's relationship 
the Nampa Police Department led him to believe "she could be an advantageous rather 
than a negative juror" was just that speculation. (Tr. EH p.49 Ls.21-25). 
The district court denied the claim, and endorsed trial counsel's incredulous claim 
that "people with knowledge of competent police work are usually more critical of police 
errors and would be able to point that out to the rest of the jury." (Tr. EH p.124, L.20 -
p.125 L.23). The district court is mistaken in its endorsement. Trial counsel never asked 
any questions about the juror's familiarity with investigative techniques and had no reason 
to believe the juror would even know what "competent police work" entailed - much less 
be critical of any investigative failures. Strategic decisions must be based on reasonable 
investigation. "[I]t is axiomatic that 'counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations 
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."' 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
In this case, there was no attempt to ascertain the juror's beliefs about police 
officers' credibility or the juror's knowledge of investigative techniques. Here, because 
trial counsel made no reasonable investigation of the juror's beliefs regarding the 
credibility of police officers, counsel could not have made a reasonable tactical decision. 
Because failing to challenge a biased juror is tantamount to waiving a defendant's 
right to an impartial jury and cannot be held harmless, this Court must reverse the district 
court's denial of the claim. 
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The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann' s Claim That Trial Counsel 
Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth Amendment, In Failing 
To Question Or Challenge Juror No. 444 About The Juror's Friendship With 
Nampa Police Officer As Well As The Juror's Acquaintances \Vith Other Police 
Officers 
A. Introduction to Claim 
The district court erroneously denied Petitioner's claim that counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to strike juror no. 444, even though the juror was 
friends with a Nampa police officer and was acquainted with other police officers. 
B. A Criminal Defendant is Constitutionally Entitled to an Impartial Jury 
The law regarding biased jurors and trial counsel's duty to adequately question or 
challenge that juror is set forth in Section II(B), above. 
C. The District Court Erred in Dismissing this Claim because Trial Counsel 
made No Attempt to Ascertain the Juror's Biases 
Juror 444 was family friends with a Nampa police officer and knew several other 
police officers. (Trial Tr., p.159 Ls.15-24). Again, trial counsel failed to ask a single 
follow-up question about the juror's views about police officers or how the juror would 
assess the credibility of colleagues. (See generally, Tr. Trial pp.192-193). 
As with Juror 328, the district court denied the claim, reasoning that trial counsel 
made a strategic decision. (Tr. EH p.126 Ls.3-24). As with the previous claim, however, 
trial counsel never asked any questions about the juror's familiarity with police procedures 
and had no reason to believe the juror would be able to criticize the investigative techniques 
used. Again, then, there cannot be a reasonable strategic decision without any reasonable 
inquiry. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 69L 
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IV. The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann's Claim That Trial Counsel 
Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth Amendment, In Failing 
To Request A Limiting Instruction Upon Admission Of Detective Baker's 
Testimony About Lynn Bumgardner's Alleged Statements About Petitioner's 
Violent Character, And In Failing To Request A Jury Instruction Explaining That 
Detective Baker's Testimony About What Lynn Bumgardner Had Said Could Be 
Considered For Impeachment Purposes Only 
A. Introduction to Claim 
The defense offered testimony of one witness only, Lynn Bumgardner. Lynn, had 
been the fiance of Kenneth Wurdemann, the defendant's brother, and was brought in from 
South Carolina to testify for [John] Wurdemann. (See generally Tr. Trial, pp.862-864). 
She testified that Wurdemann and his brother did not see one another between June 6, 2000, 
and July 21, 2000. Linda LeBrane's attack occurred on June 15, 2000. (Tr. Trial, p.864 
Ls.3-14 (arrived in Nampa on June 6, 2000); p. 867 Ls.9-17 (the brothers did not see each 
other from the time Lynn and Kenneth arrived in Nampa until approximately July 21, 
2000)). 
On cross-examination, the State asked Bumgardner if, during an interview in South 
Carolina with Detective Baker, she had said Wurdemann was violent and capable of the 
kind of attack perpetrated against LeBrane. Bumgardner denied making those statements. 
(Tr. Trial, p.875 L.12 - p.876 L.4). Trial counsel objected, but only on the grounds that 
the testimony exceeded the scope of direct examination, and the court overruled the 
objection. (Tr. Trial, p.875 Ls.17-21). Following Bumgardner's testimony, the defense 
rested. 
The State then presented rebuttal testimony from Detective Baker. Baker was a 
detective with the York County Sheriff's Office in South Carolina, and had interviewed 
Bumgardner at the request of Canyon County law enforcement. (Tr. Trial, p.881 L.16 
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p.882, Baker testified that Bumgardner told Baker that "she believed that John David 
Wurdemann was capable of any violence," that she had "reported other instances 
violence that she knew that he had committed," and "she said that it sounded like something 
he [John] would do." After Baker described the attack of LeBrane to Bumgardner, Baker 
claimed Bumgardner told him "she would not put anything past John David," and "[ s ]he 
knew him to be a violent person." (Tr. Trial, p.888 Ls.7-17). The defense objected first 
on the grounds that previous instances of violence were not responsive and not relevant to 
the time period of the attack, then objected on the grounds that the questioning called for 
hearsay and speculation. (Tr. Trial, p.887 Ls.20-25). The court overruled the objection on 
the basis it was being admitted to attack Bumgardner's credibility. (Tr. Trial, p.888 Ls.3-
5). The court did not give any limiting instruction to the jury. 
B. Applicable Rules of Evidence Required Limiting Instructions or Preclusion of 
Detective Baker's Testimony Regarding Bumgardner' s Alleged Statements 
1. Idaho Rule of Evidence 105 Requires Limiting Instructions upon Request 
Upon request of counsel, Idaho Rule of Evidence 105 requires a trial court to restrict 
the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly when evidence which is 
admissible for one purpose but not admissible for another is admitted. I.R.E. 105. It is 
reversible error for the court to deny such a request. In State v. Cordova, 137 Idaho 635 
(Ct. App. 2002), the appellate court held the district court erred in denying the defendant's 
request for a limiting instruction regarding an officer's statements contained in a 
videotaped interview of the defendant. On the video, the officer accused the defendant of 
lying. The officer's statements were admissible only to provide context for the defendant's 
answers, not for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that the defendant was in fact lying. 
Cordova, at 641. Once error is found the appellate court must determine whether the error 
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affected the defendant's rights or was harmless which requires the court to ask whether it 
e>r.~,,,.,,"r" beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the conviction. Cordova at 642. 
2. Idaho Rule of Evidence Rule 403 Requires Exclusion of Evidence that is 
Unduly Prejudicial and Rule 404(b) 
Idaho Rule of Evidence Ruie 403 states that otherwise relevant evidence "may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury .... " I.R.E. 403. Rule 404(b) 
disallows evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs or acts to show action in 
conformity therewith. I.R.E. 404(b ). 
The policy underlying Rule 404(b) was the protection of the criminal defendant. 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is 
that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime 
on trial because he is a man of criminal character." Id., quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 
506,510 (1978). The drafters ofI.R.E. 404 (b) were careful to guard against the admission 
of evidence that would unduly prejudice the defendant, while still allowing the prosecution 
to present probative evidence. Grist at 52. 
When offered for a permitted purpose, the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is subject to a two-tiered analysis. First, the trial court must determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact. Grist at 
52. The trial court must determine whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if 
established, would be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime 
charged, other than propensity. Id. Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under 
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LR.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 
probative value of the evidence. Id. 
The District Court Erred in Denying This Claim because Trial Counsel was 
Ineffective in not Requesting Limiting Instructions and for Failing to Object 
that the Alleged Hearsay Statements as Unduly Prejudicial 
I. The failure to request limiting instructions pursuant to I.R.E. 105 was 
ineffective and prejudicial and the district court erred in denying the claim 
Trial counsel could have requested and received an instruction limiting the scope 
of the evidence to impeachment of the defense witness both at the time of the testimony 
and in final jury instructions. See State v. Osterhoudt, 155 Idaho 867 (Ct. App. 2013); 
Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 46 (Ct. App. 1998). He did not do so. 
But for counsel's failure to request the instructions, there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome would have been different. Detective Baker's testimony was devastating 
- it not only called the veracity of the defense's only witness into question, it portrayed 
Wurdemann as an extremely violent man, who had committed violent acts in the past, and 
who was more than capable of committing the crimes at issue. The jury had no guidance 
whatsoever for this testimony. (See Tr. Trial, p.888 Ls.1-5 (providing no explanation of the 
limited consideration to be given the testimony and not explanation of the word 
"impeach")). Thus, trial counsel's failure to request limiting instructions at the time of 
Detective Baker's rebuttal testimony and upon submission of the case to the jury allowed 
the jury to consider damning evidence for improper purposes. 
In denying this claim in post-conviction, the district court reasoned that the 
statements were admitted by the trial court "for impeachment purposes only." (Tr. EH, 
p.113 Ls.10-21. The facts relied upon are incorrect. If one looks closely at the trial 
transcript pages 887 and 888 referenced by the district court, it is plain that the trial court 
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did not explain the limited nature of the testimony to the jurors. The district court also 
reasoned that trial counsel declined to ask for an additional jury instruction because 
felt it would only emphasize the testimony and draw attention to it." (Tr. EH, p.113 L.23 
p.114 L. l. This too, fails to take into account that the jury never knew the limitations they 
should have placed on this testimony and could well have considered the statements for the 
truth of the matters asserted. There is no doubt that the jury was well aware of the 
testimony- it completely undermined the defense's only witness. It therefore cannot be a 
reasonable tactical decision to fail to ask for limiting instructions. 
2. The failure to move to exclude the testimony pursuant to LR.E. 403 was 
ineffective and prejudicial and the district court erred in dismissing the 
claim2 
Trial counsel should have moved to exclude the testimony of Detective Baker 
regarding the alleged hearsay statements of Lynn Bumgardner under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence Rule 403, as it statement's probative value were substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. Trial counsel's failure to object under the most basic rules of 
evidence fall well below the professional standards of conduct of a trial attorney. 
The failure was prejudicial, because the trial court would have been compelled to 
exclude the testimony. First, the trial court would have had to have made the determination 
that there was sufficient evidence to establish the statements as true. This would not have 
happened. Detective Baker interviewed the witness Lynn Bumgardner, and had her sign a 
written statement. (Tr. Trial, p.881 L.15-p.882 L.2). The written statement, however, did 
not contain any of the alleged hearsay statements made by Bumgardner to Baker. (Tr. Trial, 
pp.888 - 892). This calls into question the very existence of such statements. 
2 The district court raised this issue sua sponte in post-conviction. (Tr. EH, p.127 Ls.20-22 ("Petitioner 
argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the statements as unduly prejudicial. .. ") 
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Second, it is impermissible to introduce the fact of another crime or v.rrong to 
establish propensity. at Bumgardner's alleged statements were obviously tied to 
Wurdemann' s propensity for violence. 
Third, even if relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice clearly and substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the Bumgardner's alleged statements. Indeed, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals said that Baker's testimony that Bumgardner said the attack on LeBrane 
"sounded like something Wurdemann would do," was "a damning assessment of 
Wurdemann from someone who knew him." State v. Wurdemann, docket No. 30438, 
Opinion No. 370 (Ct. App. 2006)(unpublished).3 
D. Conclusion 
Trial counsel's failures to object on the most rudimentary of grounds and failure 
to seek instructions limiting damning testimony that eviscerated the testimony of their 
one and only defense witness prejudiced Wurdemann to such an extent as to undermine 
the reliability of the trial. Had the jurors not heard or considered Detective Baker's 
claims of Bumgardner' s alleged hearsay statements, Wurdemann would not have been 
convicted. 
V. The District Court Erred In Denying Wurdemann's Claim That Trial Counsel 
Provided Ineffective Assistance, In Violation Of The Sixth Amendment, In Failing 
To Move For Judgment Of Acquittal On Count Six Of The Indictment, As There 
Was Insufficient Proof Of The Crime Of Aiding And Abetting First Degree Arson; 
Or In Denying The Alternative Claim That Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For 
Failing To Raise That Issue 
A. Introduction to Claim 
3 The Court of Appeals claimed that Wurdemann's appellate attorney's conceded that this statement was 
admissible impeachment. The Court of Appeals decision is unclear on exactly what appellate counsel 
conceded or the scope of the concession. However, I.R.E. Rule 608 (b) precludes the use of extrinsic 
evidence to prove specific instances of conduct of a witness. 
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The State presented no evidence whatsoever to support the aiding and abetting 
degree charged the indictment and Petitioner was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on 
Count Six as a matter oflaw. Trial counsel was therefore ineffective in failing to move for 
a judgment of acquittal on this count, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the issue on direct appeal. 
B. If Every Element of a Crime Charged is not established Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt, a Defendant is Entitled to a Judgment of Acquittal 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits the criminal conviction of any person "except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970). A conviction based upon a record wholly devoid 
of any relevant evidence of a crucial element of a charged offense is constitutionally infirm. 
Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199,206 (1960). There must be sufficient proof-defined 
as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence 
of every element of the offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,316 (1979). 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29( s) mandates a trial court enter a judgment of acquittal "if 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses." I. C.R. Rule 
29(a); State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 873 (Ct. App. 200I)(reversing denial of motion for 
acquittal because evidence was insufficient as a matter of law without corroboration of 
accomplice's testimony). Review of a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal 
requires that the appellate court independently consider the evidence in the record to 
determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant's guilt as to each 
material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
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The State did not Establish the Elements of Aiding and Abetting First Degree 
Arson, and Wurdemann was Entitled to a Judgment of Acquittal as a Matter of 
1. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal 
In order to be convicted for aiding and abetting the commission of a crime, a person 
must act in such a way as to facilitate, promote, encourage, solicit, or incite the actions of 
the crime. State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 384 (Ct. App. 2008). Mere knowledge of a 
crime or assent or acquiescence in its commission does not create accomplice liability 
through aiding and abetting. Id.; State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344,347, overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657 (2000). Aiding and abetting contemplates 
a sharing by the aider and abettor of the criminal intent of the perpetrator. Mitchell at 384. 
The aider and abettor must have the requisite intent and have acted in some manner to bring 
about the intended result. Id. 
First degree arson is a specific intent crime. LC. § 18-802 ("Any person who 
willfully and unlawfully ... "). Thus, intent is one of the material elements of the crime of 
first degree arson, and it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 
"Willfully" means a purpose or willingness to commit the act at issue. LC.§ 18-101(1); 
State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885 (2004). 
In this case, there was no evidence to support the aiding and abetting first degree 
arson conviction. LeBrane testified that she knew someone set her car on fire because she 
"heard the flames" and "could feel the heat" on her legs. (Tr. Trial, p.600 Ls.18-20.) She 
was face down in the dirt at the time, pretending to be dead. (Tr. Trial, p.600 Ls.13-17). 
There was absolutely no evidence that Wurdemann "acted in some manner to bring about 
the intended result." 
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Trial counsel's failure to move for a judgment of acquittal is woefully ineffective. 
the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified he didn't think the trial court would 
granted a motion judgment of acquittal on the aiding and abetting first degree arson 
charge. (Tr. EH, p. 72 L.23 - p. 73 L.11 ). He didn't indicate that he had even contemplated 
doing so, and shrugged it off with "[w]hat difference does it really make?" 
How can a trial attorney believe an erroneous conviction does not matter? Counsel 
should have recognized that the elements had not been met and moved for acquittal.4 A 
conviction is never of no consequence just because a defendant was convicted on multiple 
charges. Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656 (Ct. App. 2007)(finding ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to raise sufficiency of evidence claim regarding one of four counts of 
sexual abuse of a minor, where defendant was convicted on all four counts). 
2. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct 
appeal 
Likewise, Wurdemann' s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel should not have 
been denied. The record was clear; no additional evidence was required to establish the 
failure to prove the elements of aiding and abetting first degree arson. 
3. The district court erred in denying these post-conviction claims 
In denying the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the district court 
reasoned that counsel's decision was a strategic one because trial counsel had testified that 
"he thought it would have been counter to their defense because their defense was, yeah, a 
fire was started, but my client had nothing to do with it, he was not involved in the attack." 
4 The district court also seemed to approve of defense counsel's claim that a motion would have been counter 
to their defense. (Tr. EH, p.130 Ls.22-25). Obviously, the motion should have been made outside the 
presence ofthejury. 
27 
(Tr. EH, p.130 L.22 p.131 L.10). The district court also relied upon trial counsel's 
opinion that such a motion "would have been fruitless." (Tr. EH, 130 LsJ 8-21 ). 
This is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review. It is clear that 
the limited testimony regarding the fire did not support the elements of aiding and abetting 
first degree arson by Wurdemann. Trial counsel's beliefs otherwise are irrelevant. 
In denying the ineffective assistance on appeal arguments, the district court 
acknowledged the claim should have been raised on appeal, but rejected the claim because 
the court "[didn't] know that this would have been of much consequence since this was 
there were so many life sentences." Again, a conviction based on insufficient evidence is 
never harmless. See Mintun at 665. As argued above, appellate counsel was ineffective in 
failing to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim, and the district court erred in denying 
the claim. 
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The Totality of Some or All of the Claims Constitute Cumulative Error 
Trial counsel's deficient performance, when viewed cumulatively, demand reversal 
of the denial of post-conviction relief. 
The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there is "an 
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when 
aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's 
constitutional right to due process. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 5 59, 5 72-573 (2007)( reversing 
convictions after considering aggregation of errors). See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F .3d 1196, 
1206-07 (10th Cir. 2003)(explaining that cumulative error analysis aggregates all errors 
found to be harmless and analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the 
trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless, and further 
explaining that the analysis encompasses all errors - including legally diverse errors). 
In this case, the Court must consider all of the errors raised herein and those errors 
identified in the companion case in which Petitioner-Appellant is the Cross-Respondent to 
the State's appeal. See S.Ct. Docket No. 43384-2015 (Canyon County No. CV-2003-
4362). Thus, the Court must consider the errors discussed above, in conjunction with the 
errors regarding the misidentification and failure to provide expert testimony. (See 
Attachment B). 
Trial counsel unreasonably relied on the misidentification of his client without 
consulting an expert or seeking to suppress the misidentification. He also failed to provide 
effective assistance in showing misidentification to the jury through the use of experts. 
(See Attachment B). Thus, Wurdemann was now, de facto, the "Greasy Man." He was 
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judged by jurors with admitted ties to the Nampa Police Department and other police 
officers, but who were not questioned about any bias in favor of law enforcement He was 
judged by jurors allowed unfettered discretion as to the legal significance of Detective 
Baker's testimony about the damning statements allegedly made to him by the defense's 
only witness. And to add insult to injury, trial counsel couldn't even be bothered to move 
for acquittal on aiding and abetting an arson, even though there was no evidence to support 
it; which was compounded by appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. 
All of this evidence was presented to an improperly selected and instructed jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Trial counsel came into this most serious criminal case several weeks before trial. 
He met with his client t\vice, briefly, and adopted the description "Greasy Man." He did 
nothing to support his misidentification defense. He did not obtain expert identification 
assistance. He did not present expert identification testimony. He did nothing to ensure 
his client was tried by an unbiased jury. He put on one witness and then allowed Detective 
Baker to eviscerate her testimony. He did nothing to limit Detective Baker's testimony or 
to rehabilitate his only witness. He didn't bother moving for acquittal on the arson count. 
John Wurdemann received shan1efully inferior representation that drastically impacted the 
outcome of the trail. The denial of post-conviction relief must be reversed. 
Dated this 2i_ day of January, 2016 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ftl day of January, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served, by the method(s) as indicated, upon: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Kenneth Jorgensen 
700 W State St 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83729-0010 
ken.jorgensen@ag.idaho.gov 
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ATTACHMENT -A-
TO PETITIONER APPELLANT'S 
OPENING BRIEF 
ATIACHMENT -A- TO PETITIONER-APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
JUL 1 \ 
couNTY CLERK 
AVOUNG, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TlIE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOHN DAVID WURDEMA..NN, CASE NO. CV03-4362 
Petitioner, 
V. JUDGMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
On March 5, March 6, and March 17, 2015, Petitioner's remaining claims in his 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief came on before the Court for an evidentiary 
hearing. Petitioner appeared in person and through his counsel of record, Elisa Massoth. 
Respondent appeared through its counsel of record, Zachary J. Wesley, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney. The Court having entered its written Order on Petition for Post Conviction on June 8, 
2015, and good cause appearing, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that JUDGMENT be, and is hereby, 
ENTERED, in favor of the Petitioner, John David Wurdemann, and against the Respondent, 
State of Idaho, as to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims found in the first and 
second claim in the Petitioner's Amended Post Conviction Petition. 
JUDGMENT 
Page I of4 
Petitioner, John David Wurdemann is entitled to post-conviction relief. His conviction 
and sentence imposed in Canyon County in Case No. CR2002-5739 upon the charges of Count I 
- Conspiracy to Commit Robbery; Count II - Robbery; Count III - Conspiracy to Commit First 
Degree Kidnapping; Count IV - First Degree Kidnapping; Count V - Aggravated Battery; Count 
VI - Aiding and Abetting First Degree Arson; and Count VII - Aid and Abet Attempted Murder 
in the First Degree is hereby VACATED. 
Wurdemann is entitled to a new trial in the same case. Any new trial must commence 
within 210 days of any final order from the Idaho Supreme Court in this post-conviction case 
either affirming the Judgment of this court or dismissing any appeal from this Judgment filed by 
the State of Idaho. In the event the State of Idaho foregoes an appeal of this Judgment, trial must 
commence within 210 days of the date of the clerk's file stamp upon this Judgment. 
Wurdemann is entitled to be released from custody upon posting bail securing his 
appearance in Canyon County Case No. CR02-5739 at such times as are necessary and ordered 
by the presiding judge, in the amount to be set in that case. 
The portion of this Judgment granting Wurdemann a new trial is ST A YED pending the 
outcome of any appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, subject to any further order of the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
The portion of this Judgment vacating the conviction and sentence imposed in Canyon 
County in Case No. CR02-5739 upon charges of Count I - Conspiracy to Commit Robbery; 
Count II- Robbery; Count III- Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Kidnapping; Count IV -
First Degree Kidnapping; Count V Aggravated Battery; Count VI - Aiding and Abetting First 
Degree Arson; and Count VII Aid and Abet Attempted Murder in the First Degree IS NOT 
STAYED by the District Court pending any appeal. 
JUDGMENT 
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emassoth@kmrs.net 
Zachary J. Wesley 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's 
Office 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, [daho 83605 
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ATTACHMENT -B-
TO PETITIONER APPELLANT'S 
OPENING BRIEF 
ATIACHMENT -B - TO PETITIONER-APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOHN DAVID WURDEMANN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Procedural History 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
CV-2003-4362-C 
The court incorporates all prior recitations of the procedural history of this action and the 
underlying criminal case. Relevant to this order, the court finds that on August 4, 2011, it issued 
an oral ruling dismissing all claims presented by the Petitioner's Post-Conviction Petition. A 
Final Judgment was filed on September 15, 2011. A Notice of Appeal was filed on September 
13, 2011. 
On July 20, 2012, the Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to 
I.R.Civ.P. 60(b), along with a supporting memorandum. On August 6, 2012, the Idaho Supreme 
Court issued an Order Granting Motion to Suspend Briefmg Schedule which ordered this court to 
consider the merits of the 60(b) motion and suspending the appeal until such time as that motion 
was resolved. On October l, 2012, the State filed an Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Relief 
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Judgment Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b). On October 18, 2012, the Petitioner's Response to 
Objection to Motion for Relief from Judgment was filed. motion hearing was held on 
June 27, 2013 and the court granted, on the record, the Motion for Relief from Judgment. The 
evidentiary hearing was conducted on March 5, 2015, March 6, 2015, and March 17, 2015. The 
Petitioner was present with counsel Elisa Massoth, and the State was represented by Zach 
Wesley, Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney. The Petitioner offered the testimony of David 
Resisberg, Van Bishop, Scott Fouser, Eric Lehtinen, and the Petitioner testified on his own 
behalf. The State offered the testimony of John Yuille. 
Analysis 
This matter comes before the court after an evidentiary hearing on issues raised in the 
Petitioner's 60(b) motion granted by this court, which allowed the Petitioner to proceed to post-
conviction evidentiary hearing on the issue whether trial counsel was ineffective because the 
eyewitness identifications admitted at trial were not properly challenged at trial. In part, the 
court granted the I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion due to recent decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court in 
State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241; 192 P.3d 1065 (2008) and State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,301 
P.3d 242 (2011). 
While there are a number of issues raised in the post-hearing briefing, the ultimate issue 
is whether Petitioner's attorneys were ineffective in failing to consult an expert, to call an expert 
as witness at trial, and to challenge the eyewitness identifications in a pre-trial motion. In an 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim, a Petitioner must satisfy a two prong test that: 1) shows 
that Petitioner's counsel's performance fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness, and 
2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the results of the proceedings 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). The 
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,._,._,,._u,,u= "- for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result. Id at 686. See State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, cert 
denied, 493 U.S. 922 (1989); see also Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986); Paradis v. State, 
110 Idaho 534 (1986); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788 (1985). To prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 
280,284 (Ct. App. 2001). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that 
the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 
114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Id at 761. 
In determining whether trial counsel for the Petitioner were ineffective by failing to 
consult with and present an expert witness on the eyewitness identification, and identification 
procedures, as well as to challenge the eyewitness identifications in pre-trial motions, the court 
must look at the prevailing legal standards on this issue. In State v. Hoisington, I 04 Idaho 153, 
657 P.2d 17 (1983) the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the due process concerns and the 
standards for suppression of in-court and out-of-court identifications. In relying on United States 
Supreme Court precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "the central question is 'whether 
under 'the totality of circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the 
[identification] was suggestive."' Id. at 162, 26, quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). In 
considering the totality of circumstances, a court must determine if an identification is reliable 
based on the following factors: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time 
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crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; the accuracy of the prior description of the 
level of certainty demonstrated at the identification; and the length 
between the crime and the identification. Id In Hoisington, after examining the totality of the 
circumstances and the factors above, the court upheld the admission of the identification 
testimony and also rejected the defendant's argument that an expert witness should have been 
allowed to testify regarding the reliability of eye witness identification. Id. at 165, 29. 
In State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 192 P.3d 1065 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court 
addressed the appeal of one of the Petitioner's co-defendants, Sarah Pearce. On appeal, Pearce 
argued that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of a defense expert witness who 
would have testified regarding the police line-up procedures and the effect of those procedures 
on identifications. The Idaho Supreme Court set forth the legal requirements and considerations 
that are necessary to allow the testimony of an expert witness and agreed with the district court 
that "there are grounds for concern regarding various aspects of the lineup procedures, 
particularly the photo lineups, and though it would likely have been helpful to have testimony 
from an expert on the matters ... " Id. at 24 7, 1071. However, the district court found and the 
Supreme Court agreed that the particular expert witness that Pearce sought to use was not 
sufficiently qualified in the specific areas of identification and his testimony was properly 
excluded. Therefore, the Pearce court displayed a differing view on the use of expert witnesses 
on this issue from the Hoisington court in that the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that the use of 
an expert witness in lineup procedures, identification and memory issues may be helpful to the 
trier of fact because there are issues raised that may be beyond the common understanding of the 
jury. 
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Also relevant to this court's decision is the recent Idaho Supreme Court decision in State 
1 Idaho 584, 301 P.3d 242 (2013). In Almaraz, the Idaho Supreme Court 
addressed both identification procedures, as well as the use of an expert witness to challenge the 
specific lineup procedures used in producing the identification. In first addressing the police 
procedures used to identify the defendant, the Supreme Court applied the two-part Hoisington 
test as addressed above. Id. at 593, 251. The court also adopted "system variables" used to 
determine whether identification procedures are overly suggestive because these are factors 
within the control of the criminal justice system. Id. at 593-594, 251, 252. The court also 
adopted "estimator variables" which are the factors used to determine the reliability of the 
identification, again as addressed above in Hoisington. Id. at 595, 253. In Almaraz, the Idaho 
Supreme Court in applying these principles found that the district court erred by admitting the 
identification because the police procedures were overly suggestive and that these procedures 
were not outweighed by indicia ofreliability. Id. at 598,256. 
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the district court erred by limiting the 
expert testimony of Dr. Reisberg on the identification procedures, including the overly 
suggestive conduct of law enforcement. Id. at 600. 258. In issuing this decision, the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated "this Court still recognizes that an expert cannot opine to the accuracy of 
the eyewitness identification or the credibility of any witness as those matters are reserved for 
the jury. However, an expert witness may testify to specific instances of police suggestiveness 
that may call into question the reliability of the eyewitness testimony." Id. Specifically, the court 
stated "[t]estimony relating to the proper guidelines for conducting an accurate interview or 
lineup, whether or not those procedures were followed in the case at hand, and the consequences 
of non-compliance with those procedures does not invade the province of the jury." Id. Again, 
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Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that expert witness testimony may be utilized by a 
"'
0
·•
0
.,.,r1"'''" under these circumstances, and when there is evidence that police identification 
procedures have been overly suggestive and that the identification does not carry specific indicia 
of reliability. 
At the Evidentiary Hearing, Petitioner offered the testimony of Scott Fouser and Van 
Bishop who were trial counsel for the Petitioner prior to and during the trial in the underlying 
criminal action. Scott Fouser testified that he was a Canyon County Public Defender who 
originally represented the Petitioner. He testified that a major issue in the case had to do with 
how the co-defendants were identified as suspects and defendants. He further testified that 
despite this being the major issue, he did not file any pre-trial motions related to identification 
and he did not retain an expert on behalf of the Petitioner to challenge the identifications. 
The Petitioner's second trial counsel, Van Bishop, was retained prior to the trial by the 
Petitioner. Mr. Bishop testified that once he took over the case he determined that the primary 
issue in the case was going to be the identification of the Petitioner because of the Petitioner's 
assertion that he was not involved and not at the location of the incident. Mr. Bishop testified 
that it was his understanding that Ms. LeBrane made "substantial misidentifications ... in lineups" 
and that the video lineup involving the Petitioner "was ridiculous. It was a pyramid right straight 
up , and John is in the center ... " Despite identification being an issue for trial, Mr. Bishop 
testified that he did not seek to exclude the identifications in a pre-trial motion, and he did not 
retain an expert to address this issue but relied on cross-examination and argument to address the 
identification problems during trial. 
Given this testimony, it is clear that both Mr. Fouser and Mr. Bishop were aware of the 
issues related to the line-ups and identifications of the Petitioner at trial, and that neither trial 
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cmmsel sought to challenge the line-ups or identifications in a pre-trial motion, and neither 
contacted or consulted with an expert witness on these issues. The court finds that both counsel 
were aware that the line-ups and identifications were likely not reliable and may have been 
produced under suggestive conditions; and under Hoisington, supra, these attorneys were 
ineffective by failing to take the necessary steps to challenge the line-ups and identifications 
properly. As will be more fully discussed below, the court cannot find that the adversarial 
process functioned properly given all the issues with the identifications that were readily 
apparent prior to and during the trial. 
A related issue raised by the State is the argument that it was a strategic decision by Mr. 
Fouser and Mr. Bishop not to retain an expert or to challenge the identifications and line-ups in a 
pre-trial motion, and thus, the court should not second guess that strategic decision. The State 
argues that trial counsel pushed the matter to trial in order to avoid having one of the co-
defendants testify against the Petitioner. However, the Petitioner argues that counsel's failure to 
act should not be considered a strategic decision, especially when it is clear that there was 
substantial prejudice to the Petitioner. In reviewing the testimony of both Mr. Fouser and Mr. 
Bishop, neither testified that the decision not to challenge the line-ups and identifications pre-
trial or to fail to consult with an expert was a strategic decision. Rather the testimony is simply 
that these actions were not taken by trial counsel. This court finds that this was deficient 
performance by the attorneys at trial. The court does not interpret Mr. Bishop's testimony that 
he wanted the case to go to trial before the co-defendant would be available to testify against the 
Petitioner as explanation of why he did not do more to challenge the line-ups and identifications. 
The court will not presume that one strategic decision explains the lack of action on another trial 
issue, especially one as important as the identifications. 
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Therefore, the court finds and concludes that trial counsel's failure to consult with an 
witness and provide a proper challenge to the line-ups and identifications fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness because both attorneys were experienced criminal defense 
lawyers, both had identified the line-ups/identifications as the primary issue to be addressed, and 
neither attorney was able to explain, in hindsight, why sufficient steps were not undertaken prior 
to trial to properly challenge the line-ups and identifications. Finally, neither attorney explained 
why an expert was not consulted about how best to challenge this evidence. The court finds that 
this conduct denied the Petitioner a proper functioning adversarial system. 
The next consideration for the court is whether this failure by Petitioner's attorneys 
caused him prejudice and the court determines that the Petitioner has made a showing of 
prejudice. First, it is clear from the record that the State relied on a number of witnesses who 
identified the defendant, however, it is equally clear from the record that there were numerous 
issues and problems with most, if not all, of the identifications. Second, it is clear from the 
record that Linda LeBrane's identifications were problematic given the estimator and system 
variables discussed above and as testified to, at length, by Dr. Reisberg. Finally, the testimony 
of Dr. Reisberg clearly shows all the potential problems that existed with the video line up and 
other identification procedures undertaken by law enforcement and others during the 
investigation of this incident. While the court recognizes that these problems were apparent to 
trial counsel at the time of trial, and counsel did attempt to address these issues during trial, what 
was lacking at trial was someone, like Dr. Reisberg, to explain how the procedures could have 
influenced Ms. LeBrane in identifying the Petitioner, or how the video line-up was so clearly 
flawed that there was no reasonable outcome other than the Petitioner to be identified. The court 
finds that the record of the numerous issues with the line ups and identifications and the fact that 
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the Petitioner was convicted, in part if not fully, on the identifications shows that he was 
prejudiced by counsel's failure to either consult with an expert, call an expert witness, or 
otherwise properly challenge the identification procedures. The court finds that the Petitioner 
has met his burden on the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim raised in the Amended Post 
Conviction Petition and as presented to the court in the IRCP60(b) motion and the recent 
Evidentiary Hearing. 
Dated this <{: day of June 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on r day of June, 2015, s/he served a true and correct copy of 
the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the manner described: 
• upon counsel for petitioner: 
Elisa G. Massoth 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC 
PO Box 1003 
Payette, ID 83661 
• upon counsel for respondent: 
Zachary J. Wesley 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
• and upon: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient 
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
e, I,,-... 
By: ___ :._ffl  _.:::::,::d!=:::f;J~;:i 
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